The Mythology of Lenin's "Testament"

The Uses and Abuses of Lenin's Voice

Lenin’s infamous “testament” is an important document to both historians and socialists alike, providing insight into Lenin’s understanding of the Soviet political landscape in his waning years at a time of crucial political importance. It’s also seen as the definitive Leninist rebuke of Stalin. Various historians, including Lars Lih and Moshe Lewin, have written about its enduring political significance, but few have done a textual historical analysis of the document itself and the circumstances of its production. The purpose of this piece is to illuminate the historical context around the creation of the text and delve into the question of its authenticity.

V.A Sakharov, a Russian historian, was the first prominent historian to examine the authenticity of these documents in his 717 paged meticulous analysis of the “testament.” The scholars who have gone to reiterate the skepticism around the “testament” largely draw on Sakharov’s work. Hiroaki Kuromiya, not Stephen Kotkin, was the first prominent scholar of Soviet history to do so in the west. Kotkin later popularized the findings Sakharov’s analysis (while adding his own insight), in his highly acclaimed multi-volume biography on Stalin. Kuromiya (2005) notes how despite the interest historians have taken in the “testament,” the matter of its authenticity has largely been overlooked:

‘Lenin’s testament’ has been taken for granted by nearly all historians, but it has recently been the subject of scrutiny. The authenticity of the story (including Stalin’s response) cannot be ascertained, as there are too many documentary and evidential inconsistencies

A number of other accomplished historians, including Geoffrey Roberts, Barbara C. Allen, Catherin Andreyev, and Vladimir Tismaneanu, among others, have noted the seriousness of Kotkin’s presentation of the “testament” with interest, which is perhaps indicative of shifting perspectives in Soviet scholarship.¹ It would be accurate to describe the “testament” as a text attributed to, but likely not actually by Lenin for two major reasons: 1) Lenin’s medical documentation suggests he was severely ill and speech-impaired at the time of its purported dictation which casts doubt on Lenin’s capacity to create these texts 2) and more importantly, there is simply no evidence that he dictated it; dictation is a lengthy, involved, and collaborative process entailing a plethora of drafts, re-writes, corrections, and documentation that should be available in the archives. The complete lack of evidence in conjunction with Lenin’s grave medical state, among other evidentiary inconsistencies, indicate that his authorship of this text is unlikely (but not impossible).

After Lenin’s first stroke, in May 1922, he struggled with speaking, had difficulty enunciating complex words, could only identify a limited number of objects, was unable to do any arithmetic, had memory-loss, and could not grasp the meaning of things he had read. The doctors describe some of his challenges

“a deficiency of the motor function as a result of paresis … [and] agraphia—a deficiency of the graphical function of language, accompanied by the disintegration of the image of a letter, and of the syllabic and syntactic symbols of writing.” He also developed alexia: his “ability to read aloud was substantially damaged, as was his ability to recognize letters, words, and sentences. … A little less, but still quite substantially alexia was manifested in the ability to read to oneself” (Yurchuck, 2017)

While these were major impairments, Lenin was still coherent with necessary supports; this was complicated when his health suddenly worsened in the winter. In early December of 1922, Lenin had his second stroke. His communication and speech abilities further diminished and he began experiencing paralysis on the right side of his body. He experienced another, rapid deterioration in his health and functioning in mid December, “ a worsening noted by all the physicians—Kramer, Kozhenikov, Forster, Strumpfell, Hentschell, Nonne, Bumke, and Yelistratov” (Kotkin, 2014). This low-point was right at the time he was allegedly dictating the “testament.” The prospect of Lenin producing all these texts over only two days, while, in his doctors words, experiencing a breakdown in speech function and a serious worsening of his physical condition, stretches credulity. During this same timeframe, Lenin’s doctors were concerned that ‘overwork,’ stress and politics were worsening his fragile condition—and had limited ‘work’ discussions to only 5 to 10 minutes a day . Considering the extent of his disabilities, his capacity to dictate lucid and lengthy documents through a laborious dictation process in this state (and timeframe) remains questionable.

If Krupskaya and Lenin’s secretaries somehow had the documents dictated despite these dire medical circumstances, we would need some evidence showing how this came to be, at the very least. We have no corroborating evidence that demonstrates the ill Lenin contributed to or even viewed the documents published in his name. All we have is a single typescript that is unsigned and un-initialed (the half-paralyzed Lenin could still initial documents with his left hand—but did not do so in this case) In light of the exceptional political ramifications of this text, having Lenin initial the text is something we would expect to see done. Yet, oddly it was not.

In this absence of a signature, we can look to other documents and drafts to substantiate its alleged authenticity. Dictations generally entail “multiple copies, corrections, insertions,” as one would review and edit the transcribed drafts until a final copy was complete (Kotkin, 2014). From these series of documents we could ostensibly ascertain the exact process of how the various “barely-audible” enunciations and gestures Lenin was capable of making could have been translated, over time, into what we now know as the “testament” (Kotkin, 2014). The fact there exists no evidence that can explain the timeline of this extraordinary feat is telling. Archival searches have turned up nothing; no stenographic or shorthand originals and no rewrites. Kotkin (2014) also notes that the memoirs of Lenin’s secretaries, Volodicheva and Fotiyeva (who assisted with writing the alleged dictations), are riddled with “number of implausible or outright impossible details” during this period.

Kotkin (2014) writes that “the purported dictation had not been registered in the documents journal in Lenin’s secretariat,” and that during the time-frame of the alleged dictation session, there were only “two entries [in the journal], one noting that Lenin was reading Sukhanov …. This was supposedly when Lenin was dictating these monumentally significant documents.” Lenin’s doctors kept detailed physician notes, updated daily; none of these notes refer to, detail, or confirm the content of these purported dictation sessions and there remains a number of scheduling inconsistencies between the journal log used by Lenin’s secretaries and the doctor’s journal. Furthermore, Lenin’s secretaries continued to write a report “by” Lenin after his third stroke when he no longer had any speech function!

This all demonstrates that "testament’s" authenticity remains unsubstantiated. The evidence has proven hard to refute despite angering many. The "testament" episode is an entrenched part of the early USSR mythos and many have struggled to even consider parting with it. The arch-conservative, cold war ideologue Richard Pipes is one historian who expressed disbelief at Kotkin analysis of the "testament," but concedes that Kotkin’s major point that there is no textual or archival evidence to prove the "testament’s" authenticity (Pipes, 2020). He instead refers to how past historians have assumed its veracity, which is not really an argument itself, as Sakharov's detailed analysis of the "testament" serves as a corrective to prior accounts that have not acknowledged its lack of documentary evidence.² The opening of the archives have allowed us to reassess what we’ve come to believe as true, and we should welcome new research that disrupts old beliefs predicated on faulty assumptions. Those with countervailing claims need to provide the evidence for their protests. So far, we have not seen any.

Krupskaya’s biographer, Robert McNeal (1973), admits that the Stalin was correct to suspect her involvement in the creation of anti-Stalin “testament."³ We’ll probably never know the exact nature of Krupskaya’s (and her secretaries) likely involvement in the creation of the "testament," but we can speculate based on the historical context and circumstances. Krupskaya may have very well attempted to have Lenin dictate, but unable to extract anything of substance, she may have felt justified in creatively extrapolating from a few broken words and gestures, based on her understanding of Lenin’s politics. This, of course, does not meet the bar of authentic authorship in any meaningful sense. Only Lenin can speak for Lenin, and Krupskaya was a deeply involved political player herself with her own distinct motivations—and feuds, which complicates the question of authorship. We know she was deeply irate with Stalin over his supposed rudeness to her and this was a likely a driving factor: a personal feud. As for the origin of her anger towards Stalin: he had firmly informed Krupskaya that she had violated Lenin’s doctors order regarding Lenin’s limitation of work. According to Lenin’s sister, who witnessed the phone-call, Krupskaya reacted in the following manner: “She completely did not resemble herself, she screamed out, she rolled around on the floor, and so on” (Kotkin, 2014). The resolutely anti-Stalinist biographer of Lenin, Robert Payne (1964), says that Krupskaya went on to “wage a war against Stalin” and took an active role in the opposition. The “testament” should be seen as a bold political move against Stalin in Krupskaya’s attempt to block his ascension.

The implication of this document’s forgery is tantamount to blasphemy in some segments on the left, which makes sense, given the almost the religious tone in which it is casted: In one last maneuver by an ailing Lenin, he defies all medical expectations and produces prophetic dictation at the height of a succession struggle castigating the future ‘despot’ Stalin. It reads like a fable, because that’s likely what it is.

Even the typescript remains untitled, and the “testament” heading was added afterwards, cultivating the mythos of Lenin’s ominous '“Will.” It is an essential component of the reductive, vulgar understanding of Stalin’s rise viewed as a struggle of great personalities, in which the tyrant usurps power against the protests of the revolution’s standard-bearer—entrusting Trotsky with the heroic task of restoring integrity to the revolution. The “testament” is the mythic artifact that legitimizes this narrative. However, this narrative erases a number of inconvenient truths: such as that throughout Lenin’s illness, Stalin was the most frequently invited guest to visit with him; and during the most trying moments of his illness, Stalin was the only member of the Central Committee permitted to see him (Kotkin, 2014). Stalin was entrusted with a number of important tasks of governance over rivals like Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky (Kotkin, 2014). When Lenin became aware that he was on the path to becoming seriously ill, it was Stalin who he asked to provide him cyanide (Kotkin, 2014). We know that Lenin had close relations with Stalin throughout his illness, and was arguably Lenin’s most trusted “disciple” in his last years. This is emphasized by the Russian Historians N.I. Kapchenko and Iu.V. Emil’ianov who argue, in the words of Pogorelskin (2019), that “Lenin clearly intended Stalin, as the most talented and politically competent member of his entourage, [and] to succeed him.”

The “testament” has also been used to buttress the claim that Stalin’s rise to power was somehow “illegitimate,” a product of mass political manipulation and personalized dictatorship as allegedly alluded to in the “testament’s” line of Stalin’s concentrating of “unlimited authority” in his hands. In actuality, according to existing evidence, Stalin did not usurp power but had won the popular support of the Party officialdom through normal channels and intra-party democracy. Historian James Harris (2005) writes:

Some have argued that Stalin tipped the weight of the Central Committee in his favour by excluding his opponents from it and appointing his supporters. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that Stalin could control the slates of Central Committee members up for election at the Party congresses in the 1920s, or overtly manipulate its expansion in his favor. Rather, it appears as though Stalin largely carried the Central Committee on the basis of his policies and, in time, on the concrete results they brought. In this, Stalin appears to have had the upper hand from the beginning … Stalin nevertheless placed greater emphasis on the support he had in the broader Party membership: ‘In 1927,’ he observed, ‘720,000 Party members voted for the Central Committee line. That is, the backbone of the Party voted for us ‘‘second raters.’’ Four to six thousand voted for Trotsky and a further 20,000 abstained.

The characterization of Stalin’s rise as Stalin individually manipulating the entire political system is wrong, as it projects Stalin’s eventual titanic power back into history—to before he even had such power. While being the general secretary did grant him certain special insight and political advantages, it did not give him the ability to bend the entire political system to his will. Ultimately, Stalin’s messaging and ‘political line’ resonated with the Party. His ability to appeal to the party officialdom and membership was crucial to his success. The succession crisis wasn’t merely cold political maneuvering, but largely a battle of ideas, which Stalin won. Harris (2005) writes:

New archival sources only serve to reinforce our sense of the succession struggle as a see-saw battle of thesis and counter-thesis, of alternative visions of the future of the Revolution, presented to the Party elite and the broader membership. In his letters to Molotov, for example, Stalin insisted on responding publicly to every speech and article of his rivals

The “testament” has a great deal of intuitive appeal to those on the anti-Stalinist left due to its perceived prescience, as its characterization of Stalin resonates with his critics in light of the repressions of the Stalinist era. In this way, it seems “Lenin” himself predicted the Stalinist future; in reality, it’s not a prophecy, but was a political maneuver deeply embedded within the minutia of its historical context. In the wake of Lenin’s illness, we see a tense succession crisis with different blocs positioning for power. Stalin was quickly taking the lead in consolidating popular support, hence the “testament’s” palpable anxiety over Stalin’s ascension.

Contemporary commentators tend to read the grievances “de-Stalinization” back into the “testament,” imbuing the cryptic document with a prophetic urgency that did not actually exist. Stalin’s ascension was shocking; he was not a high-minded intellectual or orator like Trotsky, and they did not expect him to build the kind of institutional support that he did. Only once it was too late did the opposition bloc begin to organize against Stalin. This is what the “testament” is alluding to, not some kind of innate despotic evil lurking within Stalin, which Lenin tried to forewarn the Bolsheviks about. Harris (2005) describes how Stalin cultivated support amongst the Party secretaries, writing that condemnations from leading Bolsheviks’ about Stalin’s alleged secretarial authoritarianism were “not a reference to any dictatorial powers accumulating in the Secretariat,” but an expression of frustration over the Party secretaries who, as a unified bloc, coalesced behind Stalin’s political line of centralization and anti-factionalism. Kamenev even tried to expel Stalin, but this endeavor was greeted in the following manner by the delegates:

‘No way!’, ‘Nonsense!’, ‘We will not give you the commanding heights!”’ They then gave Stalin a lengthy standing ovation.

Stalin, in the words of Harris (2005), was supported by the “vast majority of state and Party officials.” In this point in time, there was nothing Stalin had said or done to have demonstrated that he was a tyrant in the making, especially when rivals like Trotsky had a greater inclination towards state “authoritarianism.”⁴ There is no shortage of passages in which Trotsky exemplifies his love of centralized, bureaucratized state-management. David Priestland (2007) characterizes his view of democracy in the following way

Trotsky went even further at the ninth party congress in 1920, suggesting that compulsion and elite authority would always be required in the economic sphere because human nature made relations of domination and subordination inevitable. Man was a naturally lazy animal and only compulsion and discipline imposed from above, by some form of executive, could increase productivity. Not only was a powerful executive needed within the enterprise to organize labour but, at the level of the state, a strong executive had to ‘militarize’, labour so that it could be distributed according to the plan. By talking of human nature, and implying that it was immutable, Trotsky seemed to be denying that popular participation in administration would ever be possible. Trotsky was one of the more extreme elitists in the Central Committee at the time.

Stalin’s political line proved immensely popular, amassing him hegemonic power that other leading Bolsheviks hoped to achieved but failed to do so. The perceived capacity for personal authoritarianism of potential successors was not a factor at play in anyone’s thinking, and the barbed phrases tossed around by political candidates has been misinterpreted based on events that happened after the fact. Regardless, Stalin’s accumulation of power is not even the document’s most pressing concern; rather, it’s Stalin’s “rudeness,” a direct product of a personal squabble with Krupskaya. In this light, the “testament” is strictly a product of a particular moment in time, a bold gambit, intended to impede a rival’s consolidation of power.

The manner in which Krupskaya was able to wield Lenin’s voice through the “testament,” was just one maneuver in the various factional battles that defined early Soviet political history. A good try, but one that ultimately floundered. But it did not ruin Krupskaya’s political career. She continued to be a major political player in the ensuing political debates and factional disputes over the years, aligning with Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky at different times. She eventually settled in as a high-ranking official in the Stalinist state. She voted in favor of expelling Bukharin in 1937 and even wrote a letter defending the Soviet state’s shameful restrictions on abortion. Krupskaya was not merely Lenin’s wife and caretaker, she was a powerful political actor with her own ambitions and motivations. She understood that navigating the lethal field of Soviet politics required political cunning, and the “testament” can only be understood in this context, one defined by realpolitik, not prophecies.

Sources:

Davies, S., & Harris, J. R. (2005). Stalin: A new history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kotkin, S. (2014). Stalin . Penguin Press.

Kuromiya, H. (2005). Stalin. Harlow, England: Pearson/Longman.

McNeal, Robert H.  (1972).  Bride of the revolution : Krupskaya and Lenin.  Ann Arbor :  University of Michigan Press

Payne, R. (1964). The life and death of Lenin. Simon and Schuster.

Pipes, R. (2020, July 23). The cleverness of Joseph Stalin: Richard Pipes. The New York Review of Books. Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/cleverness-joseph-stalin/

Pogorelskin, A. (2019). “Under Seven Seals”, Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 53(1-2), 90-106. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/22102396-05301006

Priestland, D. (2007). Stalinism and the politics of mobilization: Ideas, power, and terror in inter-war Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yurchak, A. (2017). “The Canon and The Mushroom: Lenin, Sacredness, and Soviet Collapse,” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 7-2, 165-198: https://doi.org/10.14318/hau7.2.021

1. While critical assessments testament of the testament have almost been exclusively based on evidential analysis, “rebuttals” have often resorted to speculative claims, personal attacks and offhand dismissal. Alex Pogorelskin for instance, accuses Sakharov of being a “Russian nationalist” and David Brandenberger accuses him of being a “Stalinist,” as if these political labels have any bearing on the veracity of the evidence provided. Oddly, at the same time, western historians do not seem to uniformly reject Western arch-conservatives historians in the same way, who have deeply politicized historical perspectives, such as Richard Pipes or Timothy Snyder (Snyder has flirted with holocaust revisionism with his support of the “double genocide theory”). This is reflective of the entrenched anti-communism within Soviet scholarship.

2. Richard Pipes and Oleg Khlevniuk make the argument that the document is not a forgery because Stalin did not bring this up himself. Their claim that Stalin did not protest the Testament is not entirely accurate either; Stalin was quite suspicious and suspected Krupskaya’s involvement in some way, but accusing the widow of the recently deceased Lenin of falsification would be a very scandalous move with the potential to backfire. Stalin’s ideological legitimacy was entirely derived from his self-portrayal as Lenin’s greatest disciple, and politically destroying Lenin’s devoted and highly celebrated wife would damage this.

3. McNeal’s older biography overlooks the question of the testament’s authenticity, but gives insight into Krupskaya’s political motivations. He believes that Krupskaya selectively filtered information to Lenin in order to manipulate him into aligning against Stalin.

4. For instance Trotsky said things like:

The road to socialism lies through a period of the highest possible intensification of the principle of the state…the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the most ruthless form of state, which embraces the life of the citizens authoritatively in every direction.